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THE ANTI-UNION CONTRACTS
The swinging mill bell changed its rate
To tolling like the count of fate,
And though at that the tardy ran,
One failed to make the closing gate.
There was a law of God or man
That on the one who came too late
The gate for half an hour be locked,
His time be lost, his pittance docked.
He stood. rebuked and unemployed.
"A Lone Striker"
ROBERT FROST
N the struggle between employer and employee no one issue
has been more fiercely contested during the past forty
years than the so-called "Yellow Dog" contract. Its colorful
name suggests, to some extent, the ill feeling it has aroused.'
The contract embodies an agreement that the employee will
not join any labor organization during the term of his
employment, or will withdraw from employment in the event
that he joins.
This condition in the contract came into use in America
about 1875. It was used extensively in the coal mining
regions, particularly in West Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsyl-
vania. With the growth of labor organizations, employers
seized upon it as a convenient weapon of defense and every-
where it was greatly disliked by the employees. The legal
effect of the agreement was not so great as the employers
believed, for rights and liabilities of the parties remained
substantially unimpaired. If the employee did join a labor
organization, his contract being one at will, the employer
could discharge him whether there was an anti-union provi-
-sion in the agreement or not. There would be little satisfac-
tion to the employer in a suit for money damages, and, of
course, equity would not require the servant to perform the
services. However, non-union conditions did continue to be
used, probably in the hope that the employee, knowing his
employer's attitude toward labor organizations generally,
1"The Yellow Dog Contract"-Joel I. Seidman, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science-Vol. 50, Ser. L, No. 4
(1932).
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would hesitate to join, for fear of discharge, rather than fear
of breach. So, at the beginning of the century, employers
had not much faith in the covenant, and labor organizations
were not limited in securing membership because of it.
In 1907, a very important case came before the court,
and although final determination was not had until ten years
later, the effect upon the non-union clause was tremendous. 2
Prior to June 12, 1906, the Hitchman Coal and Coke Com-
pany, operating a mine in what is known as the Pan Handle
district of West Virginia, suffered great financial loss because
of labor disputes. The mine had heretofore been operated as
a union mine. The operators became convinced of the futil-
ity of attempting to carry on as such, and therefore estab-
lished their mine on a non-union basis. This change was
apparently with the unanimous approval of the employees
and under a mutual agreement, assented to by every
employee, that the Hitchman Mine would continue operating
as non-union, and would not recognize the United Mine
Workers of America. If any employee wanted to become a
member of that union, he was at liberty to do so, but he
could not be a member and remain in Hitchman's employ.
Under this agreement, the mine ran for a year or more
without the slightest disagreement between the operators
and its men. It became apparent to the officers of United
Mine Workers of America, that union mines situated in
other states would be pressed by the competition of the
Hitchman organization. The operators of these union mines
would be unable to comply with the union's demands, and,
therefore, it was of paramount importance to unionize the
Hitchman Coal Mine. A representative of the United Mine
Workers of America was sent there for the purpose of secur-
ing a sufficient number of these employees to agree to join
the union and to breach their agreements with the operators.
The plan was to call a strike as soon as a sufficient number
could be secured, and no settlement then was to be effected
without the unqualified assent of the owners to operate there-
after as a union mine. These acts were taken by the union
with full notice of the agreements that had been entered into
'Hitchnian Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65,
L. R. A. 1918 C 497 (1917).
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between the employees and the operators. The primary pur-
pose of the union was not to enlarge the membership of the
union, but to compel the owners through a strike, or threat
of one, to recognize the union in dealing with its employees.
The Hitchman Company sought an injunction, restraining
this union representative from interfering with their con-
tracts with the employees. The United States Supreme
Court sustained the injunction issued in this action in 1917,
after protracted litigation.3 The decision was considered, at
first, a blow to the union. Injunctions had been issued pre-
viously in labor disputes, but this case, it was thought, pro-
hibited acts which had not heretofore been challenged; acts
that were at the very foundation of labor's attempt to
organize.
From this time on the non-union conditions steadily
increased, the employers being confident that they now had a
positive check on the growth of labor unionism. 4 As might
be expected, the increase was great in West Virginia. Labor
disputes there were acute. Operators, recognizing the suc-
cess of the Hitchman mine, were quick to adopt their prac-
tices, and so the "Yellow Dog" contracts multiplied. When,
therefore, the Borderland Coal Company sought an injunc-
tion in September, 1921, to prevent interference with indi-
vidual employees' contracts, it requested the same relief for
sixty-two other companies operating in the same field. Then
came the widespread coal strike in 1922, and again many
similar suits came before the court. Finally, in 1927, all of
these actions were consolidated, and a sweeping injunction,
restraining any interference by labor organizations in respect
to the individual agreements, was issued.5 In so acting, the
court believed it was following the rule stated in the
Hitchmn case. The effect of the decision was to prevent
members of labor organizations from soliciting membership
to the extent of about forty thousand men. If such condi-
tions were to continue, collective bargaining would be extin-
Ibid.
'"The Yellow Do, Contract"-Joel I. Seidman, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science-Vol. 50, Ser. L, No. 4
(1932)..
1 International Organization U. M. W. v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal
and Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) cert. denied, 275 U. S. 536,
48 Sup. Ct. 31 (1927).
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guished. If labor organizations could not obtain members,
they could not carry on. But the country did approve of
their existence and believed in collective bargaining.6 Some-
thing had to be done to alleviate this situation.
There were two possible means open to the unions.
First, legislation, and secondly, the aid of the courts. Long
before the Hitchnn case was decided, the legislators were
enacting laws respecting the non-union agreement. As early
as 1887 the legislature of New York added to its Penal Code,
Section 171A, making it a misdemeanor for an employer to
require, as condition of employment, that the employee
should not join or become a member of a labor organization.
The statute was declared unconstitutional as an unauthor-
ized restraint upon the freedom of contract in relation to the
purchase and sale of labor.7 About a decade later, Congress
attempted to make criminal such clauses in contracts per-
taining to interstate commerce, but in Adair v. United
States 8 the statute was again declared void by the Court.
The Court recognized that the right to hire labor, free from
restraint, was protected under the Constitution and an inter-
ference with this liberty, as serious as that provided in the
statute, must be deemed arbitrary, and a deprivation both of
liberty and property.0 Although in the Adair case the deci-
sion was confined to that part of the statute dealing with
the right of the employer to discharge, it was not long before
the question was presented in respect to the non-union con-
dition contained in a statute of Kansas and again the United
States Supreme Court, in the Coppage case, declared the law
unconstitutional. ° Finally, the Ohio Federation of Labor
proposed the following measure as one most likely to satisfy
the previous constitutional objections. 1  It provided:
6The refusal of the United States Senate to confirm the appointment of
Circuit Judge Parker to the United States Supreme Court was due in great
measure to the injunctions issued in these cases.
. People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073, 7 L. R. A. (N. s.) 282(1906).
'208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764 (1908).
Ibid.
- Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, L. R. A. 1915 C 960
(1915).
U"The Yellow Dog Contract"-Joel I. Seidman, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science-Vol. 50, Ser. L, No. 4
(1932).
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"Every undertaking or promise hereafter made, whether
written or oral, express or implied, constituting or contained,
in any contract or an agreement of hiring or employment
between any individual firm, organization, association or
corporation, and any employee or prospective employee of
the same, whereby (a) either party to such contract or agree-
ment undertakes or promises not to join, become, or remain
a member of any labor organization or of any organization
of employers, or (b) either party to such contract or agree-
ment undertakes or promises that he will withdraw from the
employment relation in the event that he joins, becomes, or
remains a member of any labor organization, or of any organ-
ization of employers, is hereby declared to be contrary to
public policy and wholly void."
In view of the limited extent to which the constitutional-
ity of this bill has been discussed by the courts, it is not
possible to say that it will or will not be sustained. However,
to a question submitted to the justices of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts, in April, 1930, in regard to the
constitutionality of a proposed bill incorporating this sec-
tion, the court declared the statute to be in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States and of the Common-
wealth. 1 2 In so deciding, the court was guided by the earlier
cases sustaining the non-union provisions and held that they
were decisive of the question propounded. 13 The court
pointed out in its conclusion that "there is a wide field for
the valid regulation of freedom of contract in the exercise of
the police power in the interests of the public health, the
public safety or the public morals and in a certain restricted
sense of the public welfare." "I To the same effect, the court
in the case of Coffeyville Vitrfied Brick and Tile Co. v.
Perry,5 said: "Before approaching a discussion of the ques-
tion, let us exclude any notion that the act in question is a
'Re Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 598, 171 fN. E. 234, 68 A. L. R.
1265 (1930).
" Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 13 Ann. Gas. 764(1908) ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, L. R. A. 1915 C 960
(1915).
"Re Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 598, 171 N. E. 234, 68 A. L. R.
1265 (1930).
' Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac.848, 66 L. R. A. 185, 1 Ann. Cas. 936 (1904).
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police regulation. It will be observed that it does not affect
the public welfare, health, safety, or morals of the com-
munity, or prevent the commission of any offense or other
manifest evil. Where the object of the act cannot be traced
to the accomplishment of some one of these purposes, it is
not a police regulation. Besides, the legislature has no power
to impair or limit the reasonable and lawful exercise of a
right guaranteed by the Constitution, under the guise of a
police regulation."
The provisions in the bill were also included in the act
passed by Congress in 1932 and known as the Norris-
LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act,16 and since then legislation
in many states has been enacted along similar lines. With-
out elaborating further on the possible constitutional objec-
tions, let us turn to the redress afforded by the courts.
Any modification of the strict rule announced in the
cases subsequent to the Hitchman case would be of greater
value to labor organizations generally, than doubtful consti-
tutional legislation. No state has gone farther in protecting
the unions in respect to the legal effect upon them, of the
non-union contracts, than has New York.17  During the last
ten years the New York Court of Appeals has consistently
shown its independence of the Hitchman doctrine and of the
later cases which follow and enlarge upon it.1 In fact, this
court has little difficulty in distinguishing this decision, for
it has held that the case is not an authority for the proposi-
tion that inducements for a breach of contract for a definite
term of employment are illegal, even in the case of solicita-
tion by groups of laborers. The injunction, it has pointed
out, was sustained in the Hitchman case because of the
unlawful and deceitful means employed to molest the opera-
tors, rather than to better the fortunes of the workers.19 The
facts in the Hitchman case showed that the union's primary
- 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115.
' Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863,
63 A. L. R. 188 (1928) ; Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244,
160 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dept. 1916); Third Ave. R. R. Co. v. Shea, 109
Misc. 18, 179 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1919), aff'd, 191 App. Div. 949, 181 N. Y. Supp.
956 (1st Dept. 1920).
' Stillwell Theater, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932);
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purpose was not to increase membership, but to compel the
owners to carry on only as a union mine.20 Of course, the
court recognizes the rule which gives a right of action for
unlawful interference with commercial contracts, 2 ' but when
the facts show that the primary purpose of the union is to
increase membership and better the conditions of the
employees, rather than to interfere with possible contract
rights, the rule is not applicable.22 The result has been that
peaceful picketing by members of a labor union may not be
enjoined on the ground that the purpose was to induce or
cause a breach of contract between the employer and his
employees.2 3 To declare fairly and truly that the conduct of
an employer is socially objectionable to labor unions is no
persuasion to a breach of contract, and the fact that such
action may result in incidental injury to the employer, does
not in itself constitute a justification for the issuance of an
injunction. This principle is true whether the contract
between employer and employee is one at will or for a defi-
nite term.2 4 Following these decisions, lower courts refuse
to issue injunctions merely because of the presence of non-
union clauses in contracts of employment. It is confidently
believed that consistent denial of equitable relief would soon
result in the extinguishment of the "Yellow Dog" pests.
Employers would appreciate that public opinion was adverse
to their use, and labor organizations would not be limited
in securing memberships because of them.
Unfortunately, this result has been temporarily retarded
in New York. Labor insisted upon the enactment of a law
immediately invalidating the non-union provisions. Too
' Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65,
L. R. A. 1918 C 497 (1917).
='Lamb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920).
'DeAgostina v. Holmden, 157 Misc. 819, 285 N. Y. Supp. 909 (1935)
("Whatever the law may be in other jurisdictions, it has been established by
the Court of Appeals as the law of New York that interference with employ-
ment relations in a bona fide controversy over conditions and terms of employ-
ment is permissible when restricted to lawful methods, even though such inter-
ference involves a breach of contract.").
'Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863,
63 A. L. R. 188 (1928) ; Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244,
160 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dept. 1916); Third Ave. R. R. Co. v. Shea, 109
Misc. 18, 179 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1919), aff'd, 191 App. Div. 949, 181 N. Y. Supp.
956 (1st Dept. 1920).
' Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y.
Supp. 258 (1928).
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impatient to await their gradual extinguishment by judicial
process, labor required prompt elimination by statute, and,
thus choosing, it necessarily accepted the defense of these
laws against constitutional attack. The statutes which were
finally adopted to carry out the plan are to be found in the
Consolidated Laws and the Civil Practice Act of the state.
The statutes are similar in many ways to the provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In 1935, Section 17 was added
to the Civil Rights Law and declared certain employment
contracts void.25  This section contains, practically verbatim,
the principal provisions of the bill sponsored by the Ohio
Federation of Labor. There can be no doubt that serious
constitutional problems are involved in this bill, and to the
same extent the New York Law will be open to attack. But
the section goes much farther in an attempt to provide
attractive benefits to labor. Under subdivision (a) it is
provided that any contract of hire is void if it contains a
promise by the employee that he will join, become, or remain
a member of a company union. Can it be said that company
unions, resulting from voluntary agreements between em-
ployees and their employers, are so objectionable and con-
trary to public policy that they can be arbitrarily declared
void by the legislature? Merely to state the proposition
seems sufficient to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of
this provision of the section. If in the future, the so-called
"regular" labor organizations "fall out", it may be that the
only security afforded to employees and their employers will
be through the medium of the company unions. In New
' Section 17 of Civil Rights Law provides, "Certain employment contracts
void. Every undertaking or promise hereafter made, whether written or oral,
express or implied, constituting or contained, in any contract or agreement of
hiring or employment between any individual, firm, company, association or
corporation and any employee or prospective employee of the same, whereby
(a) any employee or prospective employee undertakes or promises to join,
become or remain a member of a company union; or (b) either party to such
contract or agreement undertakes or promises not to join, become, or remain a
member of any labor organization or any organization of employers; or (c)
either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises that he will
withdraw from the employment relation in the event that he joins, becomes or
remains a member of any labor organization or of any organization of employ-
ers, is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and wholly void and shall
not afford any basis for the granting of legal or equitable relief by any court
against a party to such undertaking or promise, or against any other persons
who may advise, urge or induce, without fraud, violence, or threat thereof,
either party thereto to act in disregard of such undertaking or promise."
19361]
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York, today, such agreements are absolutely void.2" Then,
too, the statute does not contain a saving clause, so that if
the courts are compelled to void the statute because of this
manifest objection, the other provisions, embodying as they
do the anti-union agreements, must likewise fall. The law
intended as a boon to labor and a final settlement of the
struggle respecting the non-union clause seems to add greater
confusion to the controversy. Labor must assume the expense
of costly litigation to preserve a law destined to be ultimately
declared void by the courts.
To carry out Section 17 of the Civil Rights Law, the
Legislature added Section 876A to the Civil Practice Act.
This section greatly restricts the issuance of both temporary
and permanent injunctions in cases growing out of a labor
dispute as defined by the Act. Of course, it denies all injunc-
tive relief for the breach of a contract involving the non-
union clause as these are declared void as against public
policy. But the limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts
does not end there. The section provides that application
for a temporary injunction can be made only by a verified
complaint and a verified bill of particulars, specifying in
detail the acts complained of, and the persons alleged to
have committed the same. There must be a hearing in open
court with the liberty of cross-examination and the right to
submit testimony in opposition, and no affidavit may be
received in support of any allegation of the complaint. Fur-
ther, it must appear that as to each item of relief granted,
greater injury would be inflicted upon complainant by the
denial than will be inflicted upon the defendant by the
granting thereof. If this objection appears as a single
item of relief, the court loses jurisdiction over the entire
proceeding.
Under Subdivision A, the court has no jurisdiction
unless it is established that the public officers charged with
the duty to protect complainants' property have failed or
are unable to furnish adequate protection. It would seem
that if the court is to retain its jurisdiction, it would have
to find under this clause that not only have the police failed,




allegation amounts to a mere "conventional assertion." 27 As
has been pointed out, it would seem to require proof that all
public officers have failed right up to the need of calling out
troops and might be the equivalent of saying that no injunc-
tion shall issue until martial law has been invoked.28
Although the section is enacted in the Civil Practice Act
under the chapter dealing with provisional remedies, it goes
much farther than affording temporary relief. It has been
said, by way of dicta, that since the statute was found under
provisional remedies, its application, of necessity, was lim-
ited to the temporary injunction.29 Perhaps this may be a
charitable way of construing the law, but, unfortunately, it
disregards the express language of the statute. Provision is
made for both temporary and permanent injunctions in this
type of case. The seventh subdivision reads, "Every tempo-
rary injunction and restraining order shall by its terms
expire within such time after entry of the order as the court
or judge may fix, not to exceed ten days, unless the plaintiff
is ready by the expiration of that period to proceed to trial."
Subdivision eight provides that no permanent injunction
shall remain in force for more than six months from the date
on which the judgment is signed. Since this injunction is to
be issued after judgment there can be no doubt that it was
contemplated as the final determination of the proceeding.
Nothing temporary was intended. The section also provides
that the permanent injunction issued after judgment may
be extended for another six months, providing a new pro-
ceeding be instituted, conducted in the same manner as the
original, and after the court has again heard the same case,
it may continue the injunction for six months more. Appar-
ently, after one year has expired, there is no remedy against
unlawful acts. The legislature's liberality in conferring this
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in respect to "perma-
nent" injunctions, is, indeed, commendable. Of course, it is
true that the equitable jurisdiction vesting in the Supreme
Court is derived from the Constitution of the state, and not
"The Labor Injunction", by Professor Felix Frankfurter and Professor
Nathan Green.
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from the legislature 0 The problem presented is, therefore,
not analogous to the limitation provided in the federal stat-
ute over inferior federal courtsA1 The creation and juris-
diction of these courts under the Federal Constitution is
vested exclusively in Congress.
2 2
The amendment to the Civil Practice Act has definitely
limited the court in its endeavor to work out a solution to
this critical problem. Free from legislative restraint, the
courts had taken the only logical way to strike out and
minimize the effect of the non-union clause. Today, they are
powerless. Real benefit to labor can come only when the
statutes are declared void.
WILLIAM TAPLEY.
St. John's University School of Law.
' N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 11, provides: "The Supreme Court is continued
with general jurisdiction in law and equity, subject to such appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals as now is or hereafter may be prescribed by law not
inconsistent with this article."
-29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115.
U. S. CONST. Art. III.
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